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Volume 4, issue 08 August 2010 Kharkiv was not originally included among Ukraine`s four first choice Euro 2012 host cities, but the East Ukrainian capital forced itself into contention by pushing ahead impressively with a variety of infrastructure projects. This determination was finally rewarded when Kharkiv replaced Dnipropetrovsk as a UEFA host city in 2009.
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Metalist maracles win UEFA respect
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Kharkiv airport: ready for take off
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23:09 Saturday, September 4, 2010 |
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Industry Resetting Ukraine’s EU relations
Russophile sentiments of new government do not exclude development of a pragmatic EU partnership
Nataliya Novakova Volume 4, issue 6 June 2010
Most Ukrainians identify themselves as European but while they may have much in common culturally with their neighbours in the EU, the issues of Ukraine’s political culture and geopolitical direction remain very much up for debate. The Orange Revolution was famously framed as a choice between Russia and Europe, and this was followed by five years of President Yushchenko’s pro-European policies which resulted in few gains in ties with Brussels at the expense of a total breakdown in relations with the Kremlin. With the Russophile President Yanukovych now in office Ukraine appears to be once more at the crossroads. While Yanukovych has made every effort to highlight his support for EU integration, his first acts in office have drawn the country noticeably closer to the Russian orbit. Meanwhile, after five years of false dawns and Orange optimism there is a tangible sense of relief among many in EU circles that Ukraine’s membership bid appears to have evaporated. Ukraine fatigue was a logical extension of the expansion fatigue which gripped the EU’s older members following the enlargement of 2004. Kyiv’s cause has been further undermined by the unwillingness of major EU nations to risk confrontation with Moscow over Ukraine. The Kremlin has never made any secret of the fact that it regards Ukraine as within its exclusive sphere of influence and nations such as France and Germany will have welcomed a return to the balancing act Realpolitik which Mr. Yanukovych has promised. However, as the EU’s largest eastern neighbour Ukraine remains of enormous strategic importance for the EU. How will the promised pragmatism of the Yanukovych era shape bilateral ties between Kyiv and Brussels? Despite much lip service to democratic ideals, the new government has already drawn accusations that it intends to reverse many of the political freedoms and democratic rights won by the 2004 Orange Revolution. The Yanukovych regime stands accused of ignoring the opposition, trying to limit the population’s right to protest via a string of authoritarian methods. Freedom of speech watchdogs also claim that media freedoms are under threat. Since President Yanukovych took office analysts have reported a change in the style and standards of the Ukrainian media: only selected journalists are now allowed to attend the president’s press conferences and journalists have protested about attempts to influence editorial policy. More seriously, opposition TV channels have had their broadcasting rights challenged in the courts – a favourite modus operandi of authoritarian regimes the world over. Clearly this worrying trend could impact on Ukraine’s European perspectives. The first indication of EU concern is the fact that the issue of human rights has returned to the agenda of EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council talks following a long break. The EU welcomed the fact that the presidential elections had been conducted in accordance with international standards, but underlined that the respect for human rights and democratic values particularly in the area of freedom of the media remained at the core of any further deepening of EU-UA relations. The next important indicator of the government’s commitment to democracy will be local elections: unequal media coverage or inconsistent changes to electoral legislation could significantly damage Ukraine-EU relations. Orange Ukraine sold itself as a bastion of democracy in the largely authoritarian CIS – loss of this status would mean a diminishing of Ukraine’s leverage in Brussels. Can Brussels boost Kyiv reform drive? As thoughts turn from ideological issues to more practical aspects of Ukraine – EU ties, Brussels will be looking for signs of economic and fiscal reform. Successful reform is a key prerequisite for a future free trade and association agreement with the EU. President Yanukovych and his team have set out an ambitious reform programme but seasoned Ukraine watchers in Brussels will expect more than plans before they allow themselves to get too excited. The EU has already applauded the government’s Economic Reform Program as endorsed by President Yanukovych 3 June. In its response to the presentation of the government’s programme, the EU underlined its readiness to support Ukrainian reform implementation as part of the Association Agreement agenda via macro-financial assistance and a new National Indicative Programme for 2011- 2013 as well as the existing Comprehensive Institution Building Program. Among a number of policy changes long-awaited by EU which have already been adopted are a new public procurement law and a law regulating aspects of the gas market. Other initiatives, such as the recently adopted first reading of the planned new Tax Code, did not meet European expectations both in terms of content and in terms of the non transparent way it was developed. If adopted in its current form, new Tax Code would not bring Ukraine any closer to EU standards. While Ukraine appears to be at the geopolitical crossroads once more, the new regime has yet to pass the point of no return. At this stage the reinvigorated dialogue with Russia does not rule out pursuing a parallel policy of European integration. Problematic issues relating to democracy and human rights can be resolved, while the reform programmes that would bring Ukraine closer to EU legislative norms can still realistically be pushed through. Part of the problem is the fact that the new authorities are asked to choose between the Kremlin, which offers financial support and asks for no painful reforms or political upheavals, and the EU, which demands radical changes while offering nothing more than vague promises of a sunlit distant future. With sympathies among the ruling elite currently in Russia’s favour it is no surprise to find the country’s EU integration bandwagon running on empty. However, the new administration has been careful not close off all its avenues and continues to send out ambiguous signals. Ukraine may have officially rejected the idea of NATO membership, but the current parliament voted overwhelmingly to take part in NATO military exercises with NATO. Most Ukrainians will be hoping that whatever geopolitical path the country follows, it will adopt a domestic reform agenda which will bring Ukraine’s human rights legislation and business laws closer into line with EU standards. While few Ukrainians still have the stomach for the geopolitical ramble-rousing of the Orange era, the vast majority of the population recognises that domestic reform along EU lines remains the shortest route to a fairer future. Nataliya Novakova is a senior foreign policy analyst at the Penta Center for Policy Studies
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